Friday, July 17, 2015

The Partial Privatization of the National Health Service under the Cameron-Clegg Government 2010-2015


The Reforms
     With the formation of a coalition government after the 2010 elections, the Conservatives immediately moved to make good on their promise to pass reforms to the National Health Service. The Cameron-Clegg government hailed these proposed reforms as “the most radical shake-up of the NHS since it was formed more than 60 years ago” (Macdonald, 2011). The opposition could do nothing but watch as the Tory-led government made numerous changes to the NHS.  
     At the heart of these reforms is the abolition of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) and Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs), which had previously been the main funding vehicle and intermediaries between the government and doctors. In place of these trusts are so-called “pathfinder” consortia, which are essentially a pooling of resources by General Practitioners (GPs) who in turn “purchase” care for their patients. In order to hold these pathfinder consortia to account, an independent NHS Board was created to ensure that all pathfinder consortia-provided care meets certain minimum standards. Proponents of these reforms assert that the changes give more say over patient care to the patients themselves by cutting out the middlemen of the trusts and Health Authorities. Opponents of these reforms argue that the reforms amount to a “slippery slope” that will lead to the full privatization of the NHS, and also less accountability for the use of NHS funds.
     The nature of the British parliamentary system allows any party or coalition thereof with a majority of Members of Parliament to pass their legislative agenda without regard for the minority party/parties. However, any coalition government must negotiate with its coalition partners at the formation of said government, and agree to which legislative items are to be on or off the agenda.  At the formation of the Tory-Liberal Democrat coalition government, the LibDems “pledge[d] to implement most of the ideas the Tories developed in opposition, such as a new independent NHS board… and letting patients rate their quality of hospital care” (Campbell, 2010). Although the Tories made some small concessions during government formation negotiations, the heart of their proposed reforms were backed by a majority of MPs. Due to the nature of the British system, this meant in effect that the majority could pass their NHS reforms at will; barring massive defections, in which case the government would likely have collapsed. The opposition being in the minority in parliament have no legislative mechanisms for obstructing the will of the majority, save using the media to try and sway public opinion.
     And use the platform of the media the opposition did. The Labour Party relentlessly criticized the Tories’ reforms. As the 2015 elections approached the criticism became more intense. Shadow Health Secretary Andy Burnham said that “Labour warned David Cameron that his reorganisation would damage the NHS” and promising that voters “will remember patients, nurses, doctors and midwives lining up in their thousands and pleading with the Government to call it off. But they ploughed on and plunged the NHS into the chaos we see today” (LabourList, 2015).  In response to the Tories’ reforms, Labour responded with a promise to create an NHS “for the twenty-first century”.  Labour promised to create such a system by expanding funding for providing care, and adding thousands of new doctors and nurses in order to expand access and lower wait times for care.

Background        
      The National Health Service was created in the aftermath of World War Two, and has attained a position in the British psyche that will make any efforts at privatization sure to stir up a hornet’s nest of opposition. The UK is currently holding an election and most voters when asked who they trust to protect the NHS, the majority answer: Labour. This has become a perennial campaign issue in the UK, with the Tories highlighting flaws in the system in order to further their agenda, and Labour making unrealistic spending promises in order to further their own.
     The National Health Service is a massive governmental organization that is the largest such organization in the world (excluding militaries).  Although there are many who wish to see the service reformed, there are many that view the service as a national treasure, and therefore something which should be preserved in its current form. The Conservatives have consistently called for reforms to the service (read privatization), but have been unable and/or unwilling to date to implement major reforms. It is my contention, however, that even if the Tories had a majority in the parliament that the popularity of the NHS creates informal institutional constraints would limit their efforts regardless.
    Due to the fact that the NHS is such a popular institution, the Conservatives must be wary of any potential backlash that may arise as a result of a perceived overreach concerning privatization. In fact, recent polling featured in Financial Times showed that a majority of voters, both Labour and Conservative, support the idea of raising the income tax by 1% or more in order to shore up the finances of the NHS and avoid any cuts to services (Neville, 2015).  Such polling suggests that the Tories must tread lightly as they continue to pursue their reforms, and will likely seek incremental implementation of their reforms in order to avoid the perception of sweeping and radical changes.
The Process
     As stated previously, by nature of the British parliamentary system, any governing majority may pass its preferred legislation at will, without regard to the concerns of the opposition party. There is only one “veto gate” which must be opened in order to pass and enact legislation. The Cameron-Clegg government, by virtue of being a coalition necessitated the involvement of multiple “veto players” however.  Therefore, Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats were in a position of great strength when they came to the governmental-formation negotiations to discuss policy concessions and issues that would be “off the table”. Had the LibDems so wished, they could have blocked NHS reforms from the outset. But this was the first time the LibDems had any real power, and they had a different set of priorities. The LibDems were able to negotiate overall funding increases for the NHS in exchange for their acquiescence in regards to the abolition of the PCTs and SHAs.
     The Labour Party, although furious at the prospect of partial privatization of the NHS, were unable to halt the passage of such reforms as they were in the minority in parliament. Labour, long seen as the “protector” of the National Health Service, campaigned on the issue relentlessly. This constant attention seems to have had some of its intended effect, because at the time of the 2015 election a plurality of British voters named the NHS as their most important campaign issue.
     The Tories were criticized by some medical interests, as well as by Labour for their conduct in devising and implementing NHS reforms. This is because PM Cameron created a panel of medical interests to advise him on the issue of NHS reforms, but groups that were seen as critical of privatization were excluded. This led to claims of cronyism and a lack of transparency by the Labour Party. Although no such consultation was required under the British system, it is an informal institutional constraint that all interested parties to such legislation would be party to such an advisory panel.
     Although the governing majority may pass its preferred legislation at will, any perceived legislative overreach is likely to lead to a backlash from the electorate. In First-Past-The-Post electoral systems, such as the one in England, “what swings one way, can swing the other” (Shugart, 2015). Therefore, the Tories are unlikely to undertake any reforms that could be perceived as “extreme” or “radical”. Instead, the Tories will likely to continue their policy of incremental privatization, rather than push for full or total privatization of the NHS.

Results
     For the fiscal year 2014, the United Kingdom spent £6.5 billion on private-sector care for patients (Triggle, 2015). This amounts to a meager 6.1% of the total budget for the NHS. However, this figure was up from 2.8% in 2006-7. In a classic case of equivalence framing, the Tories highlighted the 6.1% figure, claiming that their reforms have had only a small effect on the NHS as a whole, whereas Labour decried the “more than 200% increase in privatisation”. Regardless of one’s ideological bent, the fact of the matter is that government spending on private-sector care has increased as a result of reforms.
     In response to these reforms, new opposition groups were formed. One such group, the National Health Action Party (NEAP), formed in 2012, has been fiercely critical of the reforms to the NHS. One of their chief criticisms of the private practices is that these companies can which procedures that they are willing to take, and that this puts the NHS at a disadvantage. According to NEAP spokesperson Dr. Louise Irvine, “[t]he problem is that private companies can cherry-pick what they want to do. They naturally do the easy stuff, leaving the NHS with the more complicated elements that are more expensive. That can cause real problems (Triggle, 2015).
    
Conclusions
     The issue of the NHS and its possible reform will remain contentious for the foreseeable future. However, without the moderating effect of the Liberal Democrats as coalition partners, the Tories are likely to further advance their preferred reforms. Having a majority in a parliamentary system is much more advantageous for a party, rather than relying on coalition partners which increase the number of veto players. David William Donald Cameron, having won a majority in parliament with 37% of the vote nationally, is claiming his victory as a “mandate” by the British people to advance the Conservatives’ agenda. One must assume that this includes the issue of NHS privatization, as it was consistently ranked as the number one issue for voters during the election.
      The Labour Party, having performed poorly in the most recent election, is left again to watch as the Tories make their preferred changes to the NHS. As a consequence of having a First-Past-The-Post electoral system the Tories were able to secure a parliamentary majority on only 37% of the vote. With the opposition in disarray, and free from the constraints of coalition bargaining, the Cameron government may continue to implement privatization reforms to the NHS system unencumbered.
     As the Tories move forward however, they could be side-tracked by the issue of having a referendum on the UK’s status as a member of the European Union. Cameron has promised to conduct such a referendum by 2017, at which time the British people will ultimately make the decision. With such a monumental choice before the country, and with the ever-growing issue of Scottish independence and the rise of the Scottish National Party, the issue of NHS reform could easily end up taking a back seat to issues that are seen as more pressing and/or significant.
     Again, because the British parliamentary system allows the majority to pass legislation at will it would seem that the Tories could pass whatever NHS reforms they wish; but due to the informal constraints of the popularity of the program, the risk of being perceived as radical, and the brutal consequences of the FPTP electoral system Cameron and the Tories are likely to tread lightly and seek incremental reform. Also, due to the fact that attention and agenda space are scarce resources like any other, there is a danger that other issues will come to dominate the Conservatives’ agenda. Especially considering that a referendum on EU membership is such a major topic of concern that one can easily see it coming to dominate the agenda.
     Until the Labour Party finds a solution to their electoral ills, the Tories will continue to be able to implement reforms to the NHS, which, to Labour are tantamount to embarking upon the road to full privatization. The Tories, on the other hand, need only worry about defections from its own members. And unless there are massive defections, not only on legislation, but to the point of its members switching parties, which is highly unlikely, the Tories will have the next five years to implement more privatization reforms. As Jonathan Shapiro points out in the journal Clinical Medicine, that the Tories’ reforms have had consequence on the system as a whole, including “an inexorable move towards increasing specialization” by health care providers (Shapiro, 2013). And as the BBC’s Nick Triggle says “[t]he words privatisation and NHS together are enough to start a fight in an empty room”, and we can expect to see the issue remaining contentious for the foreseeable future (Triggle, 2015).












Bibliography:
Campbell, Denis. Coalition agreement - the full deal at a glance. The Telegraph. May 20, 2010.
Legrand, Julian. Cameron’s NHS reform is no health revolution. Financial Times. January 19 2011 16:30
Macdonald, Victoria. The NHS reforms and you.BBC4 News. January 17, 2011.
Neville, Sarah. Voters back tax rise to fund NHS, poll shows. Financial Times. April 11, 2015.
NHS “reform” in England: where is the public interest? BMJ 2012; 344 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.e2014 (Published 14 March 2012)
Shapiro, Jonathan. Future of the NHS. Clinical Medicine 2013, Vol 13, No 4: 374–7
Shugart, Matthew. Lecture. POL140B. University of California, Davis. Spring Quarter 2015.
Triggle, Nick. NHS privatisation: Why the fuss?. BBC News. 20 February 2015.

Wilkinson, Emma. The NHS: what are the UK's political parties promising? The Lancet. Volume 385. Issue 9973, 1059 – 1062.

Democratic Dictators


     Although the powers of the President of the United States, the congress, and the judiciary are outlined in the constitution, in times of crisis presidents have consistently expanded the power of the executive, and even pushed the boundaries of what are considered acceptable actions in a democracy. President Lincoln suspended habeas corpus during the Civil War, but still held elections in the midst of the conflict. President Andrew Jackson, when informed that the Supreme Court had ruled against his actions concerning the seizure of Native lands, famously said that Supreme Court Justice “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." (Rosen, 2006). More recently, President George W. Bush instituted a program of “extraordinary rendition” (kidnapping), and “enhanced interrogation” (torture). All of these actions have two things in common: they tested the boundaries of executive power, and were considered to be quite controversial at the time they were imposed.
     Probably the most controversial executive action undertaken by an American president in modern times is Executive Order 9066. This executive order, issued by president Franklin Delano Roosevelt, established a military district that encompassed the whole of the Western United States, and led to the mass internment of Japanese-American citizens in concentration camps. Not to be confused with the Nazi “death camps”, these camps were literally concentration camps, in that they concentrated a population of people in a certain place. The hysteria surrounding Japanese-Americans at the time is what led to the imposition of this executive order. Propaganda produced for the government by Disney and Dr. Seuss portrayed Japanese-Americans as “fifth-columnists”, essentially internal saboteurs whose loyalties toward the United States were considered to be questionable. The racism that permeated the government at the time meant that there was little, if any resistance to the move by F.D.R. to intern Japanese-American citizens. Even among the Japanese-Americans themselves, there was little resistance to the massive internment program. Indeed, many Japanese-Americans fought against their ethnic homeland on behalf of the United States.
     Although E.O. 9066 was among the most egregious actions undertaken by F.D.R. during the war, it was far from the only execution of executive authority in a wartime environment. The massive expansion of executive authority during World War Two has continued to have far-reaching consequences to this day. Since WW2, the power of the executive has been seemingly ever-increasing. The current president, Barack Obama, has issued some sweeping executive orders that have caused much controversy in the nation, thereby continuing the tradition of expanding the power of the executive.  
     With the swipe of a pen, the President of the United States has tremendous power and influence over the lives of millions. Such power in the hands of a single individual is disconcerting, and something that the founders of the nation were extremely concerned about when devising our system of government. The President of the United States now has the power to kidnap, torture, and unilaterally launch a war. These powers far exceed those originally outlined in the constitution. Many of these actions have been dictatorial in nature, rather than democratic actions that have been created by the people’s representatives and undertaken in concert with the president. One is left to wonder just what may the next crisis prompt a president to do?
Works Cited:

Rosen, Jeffrey. Supreme Court History: the first Hundred Years. PBS. 2006. http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/antebellum/history2.html

The Centralization of Authority and the Paper Federation


     In 2013, months before his country was set to host the Olympic Games, Russian President Vladimir Putin revoked the right of citizens within the Russian Federation to freely elect local governors. To some, this might sound eerily familiar, because this has, indeed happened before. Almost ten years previously, Putin and his United Russia party passed a law repealing the direct election of governors for Russia’s 89 (currently 83) regions (essentially states). Instead of holding direct elections, Putin would be empowered to appoint new governors who would then have to be approved by the local legislature. However, this barrier of the local legislature was illusory. According to an article from Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, under the 2004 law “if the president's candidate is rejected twice, he can then dissolve the rebellious legislature and appoint his own choice as acting governor” (Bransten, 2004). The law was later temporarily repealed after protester exerted pressure on the national government. Then after the protest movement petered out, the law was quickly re-instituted. Such actions are highly un-democratic in nature.
     The Russian Federation is constitutionally just that: a federation. In practice however, Russia can no longer be considered to be a constitutionally-based federation. The centralization of power carried out under Putin’s reign has rendered the idea of federalism pointless, as power in Russia is no longer decentralized, rather power is highly concentrated in the executive. The regions of Russia are no longer independent subunits of the federal (central) government, they have become extensions of the executive. As recently-assassinated Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov described the situation in an interview with Reuters, "It's another lever to manage everything from Moscow” (Carbonnel, 2013).
     With the power to elect state (regional subunit) government stripped from the populace, the Russian Federation is a federation in name only. As Steven Taylor et al point out in their book A Different Democracy, in terms of a principal-agent relationship “[i]n a federal system the citizens as principals delegate to both the central and subunit governments”(Taylor et al. 2014, 85). With the elimination of the selection of the subunit governments the citizens have lost their status as a principal in relationship to the state (regional) government. Thus, one the key elements of a federation has been lost in Russia, and it should now be considered as a federation in name only. With all legally binding decisions emanating from the executive (along with a pliant parliament), the subunit governments in Russia have lost their sovereignty, again another key characteristic of a federal system is lost.
     Over the course of the previous decade, Russia has slipped closer and closer toward autocracy, and further from the ideals of federal democracy outlined in their constitution. Power has been concentrated in the executive and a vertical hierarchy has stripped the citizenry of its power to delegate authority to their regional governmental subunit, and therefore the electoral relationship between the Russian government and its citizens has been fundamentally altered.
    



Works Cited:
Bransten, Jeremy. Russia: Putin Signs Bill Eliminating Direct Elections Of Governors. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. December 13, 2004. Accessed: April 7, 2015. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1056377.html
Carbonnel, Alissa De. Putin signs law to allow him to pick Russian governors. Reuters. April 2, 2013. Accessed: April 7, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/02/us-russia-elections-idUSBRE9310GR20130402

Taylor, Steven L. et al. A Different Democracy: American Government in a Thirty-One-Country Perspective. Print. 2014. Yale University Press. London and New Haven. Page 85.

Nigeria 2015: The Peaceful Transition of Power


     The 2015 election in Nigeria was remarkable for many reasons, but what makes it unique is the fact that the ultimate victor was a former dictator that had come to power as a result of a military coup. It is not often that one hears of an authoritarian strongman turning democrat. How did this happen? Part of the answer lies with the tremendous changes that Nigeria has experienced in the last two decades. Ethnic conflict, terrorism, massive economic growth, and a deeply-corrupt political culture have all contributed to the current political/social situation in Nigeria. Recently, Nigeria overtook South Africa as Africa’s largest economy. A country with vast oil wealth and one of the youngest populations on the planet, Nigeria is also a country with extreme poverty, terrorism, and sectarian conflict (religious war).
     As the 2015 election approached, the two main candidates, incumbent President Goodluck Johnathan and opposition candidate Muhammadu Buhari, outlined two visions for the country that stood in stark contrast to one another. President Goodluck Johnathan was seen as weak and ineffective in the war against terrorist organization Boko Haram, especially after the world’s attention was drawn to the issue through the “#BringBackOurGirls” social media campaign, which focused attention upon Boko Haram for having kidnapped some 300 young girls from their village in the northeast of the country where BH is primarily based. By the end of 2014, close to one million people had been displaced by the violence in the country, and as the election approached observers worried that a “mismanaged election could trigger post-election violence that w[ould] exacerbate” these problems (Adibe, 2015).
     The two main political parties in the Nigerian election were the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which is dominant in the largely-Christian South, and the All Progressives Congress (APC), which is the dominant party in the largely-Muslim North.  The 2015 election was the fifth conducted in Nigeria since the peaceful transfer of power from military to civilian authorities in 1999, and the first in which the opposition candidate (ACN) had a serious chance of winning. Do to the ethnically-bifurcated nature of the country, Nigeria has some features of its electoral system which are designed to moderate religious extremism in political candidates. Most notably, a candidate must receive at least 25% of the votes in two-thirds of Nigeria's 36 states in order to win the election in a single round. If no candidate clears this threshold, then a run-off election must take place within a week (BBC, 2015).In response to this rule, most Christian candidates select a Muslim as their running mate and vice versa. This was exactly the case in this election.
     Opposition candidate Gen. Muhammadu Buhari is quite a remarkable military/political figure in Nigerian society. Buhari has famously participated in multiple military-led coup d’Ă©tats, including one that installed him as head of state in 1983. Buhari ruled this military dictatorship until 1985, when he himself was overthrown by another general! After power was transferred to civilians in 1999, Buhari ran in every single presidential election since 2003.  
     Previous elections in Nigeria have been “full of irregularities (including underage voting, ballots that did not include all the names of the candidates, errors in voter registration, lack of secrecy of voting, and inadequate polling stations), in addition to improper conduct such as stealing ballot boxes, intimidation, and vote buying” (Library of Congress, 2015). With this in mind, Nigeria has become notorious as a bastion of criminal political activities. In order to combat corruption Nigeria has created an independent election commission (INEC). In tandem with the monitoring and conduction of elections, the use of biometric identification cards have also been implemented for the first time.
     Muhammadu Buhari was declared the winner by the INEC, having received 15,424,921 votes—and having received at least 25% of votes in 2/3rds of states—and his opponent, incumbent president Goodluck Johnathan, having received 12,853,162 votes. Buhari swept the northern territories, and made inroads into the South, including the states of Kogi and Benue (See Figure 1).  Many analysts have attributed Buhari’s phenomenal success to the fact that Goodluck Johnathan was perceived as being weak in his response to Boko Haram. Buhari, by contrast, was seen as a “man of action” that would quickly take on BH were he to be elected.  
     In American politics, there is a famous quote from then-adviser to President Clinton, James Carville, who said that when it comes to which issue is most important in an election “it’s the economy, stupid”. However, this was not the case in the 2015 Nigerian election. Security/defense issues were clearly the most important issues at play. Nigerian Christians clearly overrode their ethno-religious concerns in order to vote for Mr. Buhari. Buhari has made comments in the past, which indicate strong support for the implementation of Sharia Law, which is anathema to Christian and/or secular voters.  It was Buhari’s experience as a military officer which was featured most prominently in his campaign. In fact, he appeared on the ballot with military title as “Gen. Muhammadu Buhari”.
     The fear that the elections could result in violence, or even a refusal to concede were the incumbent to lose were very real. Never before in Nigeria had the incumbent president lost an election and then freely transferred power to the winner. The peaceful transfer of power is one of the hallmarks of a democracy, making this election a critical one for Nigeria’s fledgling regime. Luckily, there was very little violence, and President Goodluck conceded the election to Muhammadu Buhari.  President Johnathan even called Mr. Buhari to congratulate his opponent directly. While people in many liberal democracies see this is as the norm, for Nigerians this was the first time it has ever happened, it’s a big deal.
     President-elect Buhari was gracious in his victory, even though he had been extremely critical during the campaign. He pledged to immediately undertake operations against Boko Haram, including operations to find the hundreds of girls that have been kidnapped by BH in the north and northeastern areas of the country. If Mr. Buhari is successful against Boko Haram it will show that he is able to follow through on his election promises, and it will be another positive signal that Nigerian politicians are respecting the will of the voters.
     Many political scientists have not considered Nigeria to be a democracy, because prior to the 2015 election there had never been a peaceful transition of power (much like the PRI in Mexico for most of the 20th century). Since independence, Nigeria has gone through many trials and tribulations. Like most post-colonial societies, they have struggled with issues of governance and corruption, military coup d’Ă©tats, and issues of resource dependence. With more than 180 million people, Nigeria is one of the most populous nations on the planet. The trend toward a successful liberal democracy is not just good news for Nigeria, but can be touted as an example to follow for nations that are currently undergoing many of the same struggles that face Nigeria.
     If a country like Nigeria, which is divided ethnically and religiously, can have contentious, but fair elections, and all sides can accept the results as the will of the people, then its prospects for the future are bright indeed. With massive amounts of oil, and the world’s third-largest movie industry (just behind India, but expected to surpass them), Nigeria has tremendous potential. As most of the world’s population is aging, Nigeria’s is much more youthful than the world average. If Muhammadu Buhari can make good on his campaign promises of continued economic prosperity, a crackdown on Boko Haram, and a war on corruption, then he will be likely to be rewarded at the ballot box. The danger is that Buhari favors his ethnic/religious base over the needs of the country as a whole, and if he pursues the implementation of Sharia Law there is sure to be a backlash by the Christian South.
     To recap, just how could a former military dictator be democratically elected to lead a country? Ironically, it was precisely because of Buhari’s military experience, including training at the United States War College, and his perceived incorruptibility that allowed for his election. The deteriorating security situation in the North, and the attention focused upon Nigeria through the actions of Boko Haram have overruled any positive feelings Nigerian voters may have had toward Goodluck Jonathan for the growing economy.
     It remains to be seen if Mr. Buhari will be able to root out corruption and destroy the terrorist group Boko Haram, all while moderating the Islamic impulses toward Sharia Law within his own electoral base. If he is able to do so, then he will be remembered by the history books, but if he does not, then it could lead to increasing violence in a country which has already experienced so much. Only time will tell, but the very fact that Nigeria conducted fair elections in which the loser conceded is a major milestone for Nigeria’s developing democracy.
    
   


Bibliography:
Adibe, Jideofor. THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA: THE ISSUES AND CHALLENGES. Africa Growth Initiative. Brookings Institution. 2015.
BBC News. How Nigeria's presidential election works. March 27, 2015.  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31111572

Library of Congress. Nigeria: Election Laws. 2015. http://www.loc.gov/law/help/nigeria-election-law/index.php

Disproportionality across Electoral Systems

Disproportionality across Electoral Systems
     When electoral engineers design an electoral system they are faced with myriad options for doing so. From First-Past-The-Post (Single Member Plurality (SMP)), to open-list Proportional Representation, to Mixed-Member Proportional systems, there are numerous ways to design an electoral system.  With each electoral system there are pros and cons. For example, FPTP systems are notorious for their disproportionate results and “pluralitarian” governments, whereas PR systems are, as the name suggest, much more proportional. Proportionality, the difference between a party’s share of votes and share of seats in parliament, is one of the most important metrics that one must consider when comparing electoral systems.
     So, which electoral systems offer the least and highest amounts of disproportionality? Political Scientists have long noted the extremely disproportionate results that arise in FPTP systems.  In the most recent election in the United Kingdom for example, the Tories won a majority of seats in parliament, while only receiving 37% of the vote nationally. In some cases, under the FPTP system, the party which receives the most votes can actually end up in the minority of parliament! Another example of how FPTP leads to high degrees of disproportionality is the case of the United Kingdom Independence Party, and its performance in the 2015 election. Here, UKIP received about 13% of the national vote, but only received one seat in parliament (1/650th of parliament). This stands in sharp contrast to the performance of the Scottish National Party, which received 56 seats in parliament on less than 5% of the national vote! To summarize, UKIP received almost three times as many votes as the SNP, but the SNP received 56 times the representation in parliament. Such disproportionality is a direct result of the electoral system in place. If the system were perfectly proportional, then UKIP would have almost three times the representation as the SNP, rather than the current situation of 56 to 1 in favor of the SNP.
     The primary measure of proportionality in comparing electoral systems is the Gallagher Index of Proportionality. This index goes from zero—meaning no disproportionality—to 100, meaning complete disproportionality (which, in reality could never occur in a democracy). Essentially, the higher the number, the more disproportionate the results of an election are. Using the Gallagher Index of Proportionality (GIP), I have compared thirteen countries across four general types of electoral systems. These four electoral systems are as follows: FPTP, Closed-List PR, Open-List PR, and Mixed systems. I have selected three countries from each of these electoral system categories, with the exception of FPTP, from which I have selected four countries. I then took the average of the GIP scores for the elections during years 1990-2011 (inclusive). The results are unsurprising, with the FPTP systems having higher rates of disproportionality, with the exception of the United States, which has relatively low levels of disproportionality, especially considering the fact that it has an FPTP electoral system.
     The sample average differences across systems are quite in line with expectations, with Open-List PR system having the least amount of disproportionality, FPTP systems having the highest amounts, and Mixed and Closed-List PR systems in between. The sample average of GIP scores can be seen in Table 2. The results are more striking at the national, rather than system-level. Some notable examples of extremely high or low disproportionality are the United States, South Africa, and the Netherlands.  The United States stands out among its FPTP peers with its relatively low rate of disproportionality, with an average GIP score of 3.55 (See Table 1). This is likely a result of the “psychological effect” of Duverger’s law, in which voters respond to the “wasting” of votes by voting strategically for a party which has a realistic chance of winning an election. South Africa has the most proportional results of any country in the sample, with an average GIP score of 0.3 (See Table 1). All of the mixed systems in my sample have relatively large amounts of disproportionality when compared to PR systems, but this is what one would expect given that these systems contain Single Member Districts.
     If one considers the democratic principle of “one person, one vote”, then it is clear that Proportional Representation is the most “democratic” of electoral systems. FPTP systems, with their systemic problem of wasted votes, lead to the most disproportionate outcomes, like the example of UKIP and the SNP noted earlier. Mixed systems try to strike a balance between the regional/personal nature of SMDs and the proportionality of PR. Some countries, like New Zealand, have reformed their electoral systems to achieve higher degrees of proportionality. If proportionality was the only metric that mattered when it came to choosing electoral systems, then all of them would be some variation of PR. But other factors must be taken into consideration, such as religious and/or ethnic differences, geography, and even tradition. That is why there is such variation within and across electoral systems.
    




Table 1: Average Disproportionality of Election Results across Electoral Systems 1990-2011 (inclusive)
Country
Electoral System
Average Disproportionality 1990-2011 (inclusive)
Canada
FPTP
12.20
India
FPTP
7.42
United Kingdom
FPTP
15.93
USA
FPTP
3.55
Israel
Closed-PR
2.12
Spain
Closed-PR
5.70
South Africa
Closed-PR
0.3*
Denmark
Open-PR
1.34
Finland
Open-PR
3.26
Netherlands
Open-PR
1.02
Germany
Mixed
3.70
New Zealand
Mixed
2.69**
Italy
Mixed
6.13
 *South Africa 1994-2011.
**New Zealand 1996-2011.




Table 2: GIP Sample Averages
Type
GIP Sample Average
FPTP
9.78
Closed-PR
2.71
Open-PR
1.87
Mixed
4.17














Bibliography:
Carey, John M, and Simon Hix. 2011. “The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 55(2): 383–397.
Gallagher, Michael and Mitchell, Paul. The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford University Press. Print. 2005.

Gallagher, Michael. 1991. “Proportionality, Disproportionality, and Electoral Systems.” Electoral Studies 10(1): 33–41.

FPTP in the UK

First past the Post: Thirteen Percent Gets You One Seat in Parliament
     In the United Kingdom elections are conducted under a “first-past-the-post” system. This means that whichever candidate receives a plurality of the votes within a given district (called constituencies) takes the seat. Since a majority of votes is not required, but only a plurality, it is conceivable that if ten candidates were running for a seat and the vote were split almost equally that one could win a seat while only receiving less than 11% of the total vote within said district. This FPTP system seems to destroy the democratic concept of “one person, one vote” as many votes are simply “wasted" when they are discarded within a district, rather than be tallied nationally. This result is highly undemocratic.
     Of all the possible democratic electoral systems currently in place around the world, the FPTP system seems to produce the most undemocratic and disproportionate results. In the most recent UK election, the UK Independence Party received some thirteen percent of the vote nationally, but only attained one seat in parliament. The reason that such a result is possible is because the UKIP votes were distributed geographically, rather than concentrated within a few districts. The FPTP system rewards the largest and best organized parties, as well as those that are regionally concentrated. As a result, one would expect two main parties to dominate per “Duverger’s Law”, but this is not the case in the UK. Duverger’s law predicts that as a result of there being so many wasted votes in the FPTP system that voters will react through the “psychological effect” and choose to cast their votes for a party with a chance of winning. But in the UK, it seems that voters cast their ballots based on whomever they wish for the most part, leading to more parties than one would otherwise expect.
     The disproportionate results that are inherent to the FPTP system have led to widespread frustration among the electorate, and a sense that the system is broken. This frustration was clearly expressed by Douglas Carswell, UKIP’s sole minister elected to parliament with his statement that “[a]cross the country about 5 million people will have either voted for Ukip or for the Green Party. Those 5 million people will be lucky to get a tiny handful of MPs in the House of Commons”, and further “[t]hat failure to translate those 5 million votes into seats is less a reflection of how my party or the Green Party campaigned, rather it tells us how dysfunctional our political system is” (Warroll, 2015).  Under a system of Proportional Representation, BBC’s Channel 4 estimates that UKIP would have received 83 seats in the parliament. Under the current system, even though UKIP received some thirteen percent of the vote in the latest election they only sent one minister to parliament (1/650th of the House of Commons)! (Warroll, 2015).
     The fact that the FPTP system has such disproportionate results have inevitably led to calls for electoral reform. But not everyone is dissatisfied with the current system. The Tories received a majority of seats in the House of Commons even though they only received thirty-seven percent of the vote, and this was considered to be a resounding victory! While the minor parties such as the Greens, UKIP, etc… may be calling for a system of proportional representation, the two main parties the Tories and Labour seem quite comfortable with the current system that heavily favors them at the expense of the minor parties. Regardless of one’s ideological bent, the inevitable results of the FPTP system of voting fly in the face of most principles of fairness and democracy. How can one justify such disproportionate results, let alone espouse such an electoral system as being democratic and worthy of emulation?
     The United Kingdom seems primed to undergo something of a political revolution. The meteoric rise of the Scottish National Party and overall dissatisfaction with the current regime have resulted in growing calls for electoral reform. The last time that such calls were made, it resulted in a failed push for the “Alternative Vote”.  Although a system of AV would address the issue of wasted votes, it would do little to change the overall disproportionality of the electoral system as a whole, because such a system tends to favor the largest parties just like FPTP.  The problem with reform lies within the fact that there is little-to-no incentive for the largest parties that benefit greatly from the current system to enact reforms that would lead to a loss in seats.
     The most-recent election in the UK clearly illustrates the advantages of the FPTP system for larger parties. The Tories for example, won some 51% of seats in parliament, while receiving some 37% of the vote. Only in a FPTP system (as far as I know) can less than 40% of the vote translate into a majority of seats in parliament. The Labour party’s results were somewhat more in line with its share of votes, 36% of seats on 30% of the vote. But when you compare the Liberal Democrats results with those of UKIP, or SNP with those of UKIP, the difference are stark. The Liberal Democrats received a paltry 8% of the vote nationally, but received eight seats, whereas UKIP received about 13% of the nationwide vote and only received a single seat!
     The disproportionate results that arise from the FPTP system are sure to continue to cause frustration among those parties whose representation in parliament is not commensurate with the amount of votes they receive. As UKIP leader Nigel Farage said following the election "[p]ersonally, I think the first-past-the-post system is bankrupt…It is bankrupt because one party can get 50% of the vote in Scotland and nearly 100% of the seats, and our party can get 4 million votes and just one seat" (BBC, 2015).  Such are the travails of the FPTP system.

Works Cited:
BBC. Nigel Farage resigns as UKIP leader as the party vote rises. May 8, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32633719
Warroll, Patrick. FactCheck: what would parliament look like under Proportional Representation?. BBC Channel 4 News. May 8, 2015. http://blogs.channel4.com/factcheck/factcheck-parliament-proportional-representation/20893 .
    
    

     

Imperialism in Crimea and the Donbass: Territorial Claims and Perceived Interests in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.


The Invasion
     In August of 2014, following political upheaval and the resulting violence, the Russian Federation invaded the neighboring nation of Ukraine. Many international political commentators were caught unaware. Much like the global financial crisis of 2008, almost no one saw the arrival of this conflict coming. Also, like the 2008 financial crisis known as the “Great Recession”, the seeds of this conflict were sewn well in advance, and seem impossible not to notice in retrospect. Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander Motyl were some of the few political commentators to acknowledge the possibility of war.  Karatnycky and Motyl, writing for Foreign Affairs in 2009, wrote that “given Russia’s regime type and its power today, a nondemocratic Russia might well take advantage of Ukraine’s increased weakness” (Karatnycky and Motyl 2009, 113).
     Ethno-cultural associations with space have long been the cause of conflict. Take Jerusalem for example, where three of the so-called “great” religions vie for dominance of the land, with rivaling narratives and competing historiographies that each in turn use as their claim for possession. This tribalistic ethno-nationalism, itching for war against the “other”, the enemy, the foreigner, is a cornerstone of modern fascist political thought. When Adolf Hitler annexed the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, he claimed to be protecting ethnic Germans. A similar situation has been at play in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation as of late. A reactionary and xenophobic regime has now taken root in Moscow, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. Putin has made it his raison d'ĂȘtre to “protect” ethnic Russians within the entirety of the former Soviet Union.
     With this in mind, the Russian Federation has been increasingly active, both in terms of its military/espionage activities, and in asserting its economic/political objectives, within the whole of the former Soviet Union. From anti-terror operations in the Caucasus and the military offensives in South Ossetia—a disputed region on Russia’s border with Georgia—to the “frozen conflict” in Moldova, the Putin regime has become increasingly aggressive within its perceived sphere of influence. Many international relations and military experts now see these actions as “dry runs” for its current actions in Ukraine. 
The “Heart” of Russia


Figure 1. “Donbass serdtse Rossii”
Donbass Heart of Russia
     All wars require justifications for the actions of the aggressors, and the current conflict is no exception. The United States for example, has repeatedly cited the “Monroe Doctrine”—which considers the entire Western hemisphere as its sphere of influence—as its justification for the use of force from the Spanish-American war, to President Kennedy’s embargo of Castro’s Cuba. With the conflict in Ukraine, Russia is acting in much the same way, within its perceived sphere of influence.  As Dominic Johnson and Monica Toft writing in Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution put it, the Donbass “is a flashpoint not because Russia is throwing down the gauntlet to the west, but because it is throwing down the gauntlet on what it considers home territory” (Johnson and Toft 2014, 90).  
     The Donets Basin, or Donbass, is a large region encompassing the eastern most oblasts — regions or states — of Ukraine and extending into Russia until Rostov on Don. This geological formation is mainly contained within the internationally recognized borders of Ukraine. The region is the industrial heartland of not only Ukraine, but has long been featured in Soviet and then Russian propaganda as the “heart of Russia” (Figure 1).                            
     The Russification of eastern Ukraine began during the reign of Soviet dictator Josef Stalin, whose extractionary policy of forced starvation toward Ukraine led to the mass deaths of ethnic Ukrainians, in an event remembered as the “Holodomor” —extermination by hunger— which has been deemed by many historians to be an act of genocide. While Stalin was starving millions of ethnic Ukrainians, he was simultaneously moving large populations of ethnic Russians into the then-recently depopulated Donbass of Ukraine. This massive depopulation of ethnic Ukrainians and deliberate importation of ethnic Russian nationals would have wide and far-reaching consequences. As Andreas Kappeler notes, as a result of Stalin’s policies favoring ethnic Russians in Ukraine“[t]he relations between the two independent states were from the very beginning difficult” and almost all of the resulting differences between the two nations “have their roots in the imperial past” (Kappeler 2014, 108).
     The media in the Donbass is exclusively Russian, and Russian media is almost exclusively under the purview of the Russian state.  Under the watchful eye of Vladimir Putin, the Russian government has consistently cracked down on sources of information that are not favorable to the state. As Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander Motyl stated, the Russian media are “now pliant government instruments” (Karatnycky and Motyl 2009, 114).These Russian state media operations have painted the Ukrainian people as fascist puppets of the “West”. This constant bombardment of Russian government propaganda has inevitably led to negative perceptions of the Ukrainian people by the Russian public, as well as with ethnic Russians in the east and south of Ukraine. As Karatnycky and Motyl have pointed out, in “polls conducted in January 2009, some 62 percent of Russians are negatively inclined toward Ukraine and 24 percent are positively inclined. (In contrast, the same polls showed that only 9 percent of Ukrainians have negative feelings toward Russia, whereas 71 percent have positive ones.)” (Karatnycky and Motyl 2009, 114).
A Question of Identity
     The nation of Ukraine has been in a precarious state since its inception. The lack of a founding national narrative left people unsure about their national identity and place in world history.  As the Soviet Union rapidly dissolved in the early 1990s, Ukraine became an independent country almost overnight. The main concern of the Russian government at the time was the fact that Ukraine, as an integral part of the Soviet Union and its defenses, was home to one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. In an international agreement dubbed the Budapest Memorandum, The United States, Russia, and Great Britain all committed to the defense, and recognition of, Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange for its promise to surrender the entirety of its nuclear forces. This is a decision that has come to haunt Ukraine.
     Since gaining independence, Ukraine has experienced a seesaw of governments, a “color” revolution, political assassinations, and a deepening divide between the Russian East and the Ukrainian West. It is exactly these kinds of divisions along ethnic lines, which lead to the bifurcation of states. People form their associations with a given piece of land through “duration and distribution of ethnic kin” within said territory (Johnson and Toft 2014, 91). And within Ukraine, multiple generations of ethnic Russians have lived in the eastern regions, particularly in the Donbass. As a result of this, Russia, “under the pretext of the protection of the rights of linguistic minorities…uses the language question as an instrument of pressure and intervention into the internal affairs of Ukraine” (Kappeler 2014, 111).
     The latest revolution in Ukraine occurred when then-President Yanukovich spurned a promised economic association with the European Union in favor of entry into Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union, which includes, along with Russia, the countries of Belarus and Kazakhstan.  People by the hundreds of thousands took the country’s independence square, known as the “Maidan”, in protest. This last minute switch in favor of the Russian trade union was seen by many Ukrainian citizens as yet another attempt by Russia to subvert the will of the Ukrainian people.
Little Green Men and Hybrid War
     When armed Russian-speaking Special Forces arrived in Crimea to take control of strategic locations throughout the territory, they bore no military insignia to identify themselves. At the same time, the Russian government denied having any involvement. These soldiers that had seemingly appeared from nowhere, were jokingly dubbed “little green men”, in reference to the U.F.O. phenomenon, and the fact that these soldiers wore green combat fatigues.  Although the Russian government initially denied having any involvement in these military operations, Vladimir Putin would give a victory speech in the region’s capital Sevastopol several months later.
     Alongside the use of Special Forces and conventional military operations, the Russians are conducting a massive propaganda and media relations campaign in both Ukraine, and within Russia itself. This includes providing local “rebel leaders” with constantly updated lists of talking points for use when confronted by media organizations. Because of this added propaganda component of the war, the current conflict has been called a “Hybrid War”.
     When these Russian Special Forces operators arrived in Crimea, they immediately seized the parliament and hoisted the flag of the Russian Federation. Simultaneously, they captured other strategic locations in the region, most importantly the local television, cellular, and radio communications stations. These communication sites would be necessary to disseminate information favorable to the Russian government to the local populous.
     One of the most prominent features of Russia’s immense state-backed system of media being put to use in the conduct of this Hybrid War is the television network Russia Today. RT has a budget that enables it to be broadcast in multiple languages and territories twenty four hours a day.  This broadcast presents viewers with imagery that paints the Ukrainians as uncaring fascists that are perpetrating a genocide against ethnic Russians in the east of Ukraine.
The Birth of a Nation
     Ironically, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has given it the very thing it was lacking: a foundational national narrative. The Ukrainians now see themselves as a people and a nation fighting for its survival and the right to self-governance in the face of foreign aggression. In Ukraine there is a new patriotic fervor, and new national slogans such as “glory to Ukraine, glory to heroes”. A large portion of Ukraine’s defense forces are comprised of volunteer units with names like “Azov Battalion” and “Donbass Battalion”. Unlike the national army, these people are not paid for their service and aren’t entitled to government health benefits that are available to professional soldiers, but nevertheless, they fight. These men and women that fill the ranks of these units are farmers, business professionals, teachers, and former company owners that feel it is their patriotic duty to defend their homeland.
     The new Ukraine, oriented toward Europe, is trying to break free from its subaltern position in relation to Russia. The Ukrainians look at their neighbors that have become a part of the European Union and are filled with a sense of both apathy and envy. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s neighbors that have become members of the European Union—Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, etc…—have seen an explosion of growth in their economies and a corresponding rise in standards of living. Whereas, Ukraine itself has stagnated—by some estimates its economy has actually contracted in real terms since independence—the former Soviet countries aligned with Europe have thrived. Within the populace of Ukraine, this has caused a desire to bring themselves into alignment with the greater European community. This desire for European alignment, has in turn, bred yet more anger and suspicion on the part of Russia toward Ukraine and its ambitions.
“Novorossiya”
     Many of the Russian soldiers fighting in the Donbass proclaim to be fighting for the formation of a new nation called “Novorossiya” (New Russia). The Russian soldiers that are fighting for this imagined state fly a battle flag that, because of its visual similarity, is quite reminiscent of the Confederate “stars and bars” from the American Civil War. In many instances, flying alongside this battle flag, is a flag with a depiction of Jesus Christ—in traditional Russian Orthodox fashion—upon a red background, that is an adaptation of a Tsarist imperial flag from the 1800s. This is an obvious allusion to the alliance of the Russian Orthodox Church, and the ethno-nationalist ideology espoused by Vladimir Putin. This imperialist component of Putin’s fascist ideology, which harkens back to the 1880s, stands in stark contrast with the Ukrainian narrative of independence and struggle for democracy. As Andreas Kappeler asserts, for the “Russian Empire the close cooperation of the state and the Orthodox Church was an important factor of legitimation and stability. Today’s Russia follows this policy and is using the Orthodox Church as an instrument of its politics of hegemony” (Kappeler 2014, 111).  The term Novorossiya itself, in reference to the area of the Donbass harkens back to Tsarist terminology, and has been quite deliberately reintroduced by Putin.
     The use of such terminology by Putin and his regime is telling. Combined with statements like “Ukraine is not even a country”, and that the Ukrainian military’s defense of its territory as “smell[ing] of genocide”, given at multiple press conferences, we are given valuable insight into Vladimir Putin’s inner thoughts. Andrei Tsygankov, writing for Russian Analytical Digest, states that the “Kremlin now view[s]…Ukrainian values as incompatible with those of Rus­sia” and that Putin said in a press conference the he viewed the recent political actions in “Ukraine as the ‘rampage of Nazi, nationalist, and anti-Semitic forces.’”(Tsygankov 2014, 4).  Note the attribution of negative terms like ‘Nazi’ and ‘anti-Semitic” to the democratic actions of the Ukrainian people. This labeling of the enemy with your own flaws is yet another example straight from the neo-fascist playbook. Russia has clearly shown that it is more than willing to use military force to achieve its political objectives. And if Putin’s objective is to reunite the entirety of the ethnic Russian population with its previous homeland, then the danger to Ukraine and Europe as a whole could not be clearer.
Torn Asunder
     Currently the intensity of the war has slowly deescalated as the Ukrainian and Russian governments have agreed to a ceasefire known as the “Minsk Agreement”, named for the city in which the French and German-brokered deal occurred. Many, including the Ukrainian government, do not believe that the cease fire will hold, and that it is merely a ploy by Putin to bide time and amass further forces for an all-out assault on the strategic port city of Mariupol. Mariupol is strategic not only because it is a port city, but also because of the fact that it is the only large city in the region that separates Russian forces in the Donbass from those in Crimea.
     As mentioned earlier, Russia has previously intervened militarily in the areas of the former Soviet territories. One of these territories is that of Moldova and its Transnistria separatist region that borders western Ukraine and the port city of Odessa. Here, Russia maintains a troop presence of several thousand men. The fear in Kyiv is that the Russians will not be content with their gains in Crimea and the Donbass, and that they could launch a war for the totality of the regions of Ukraine containing ethnic Russians. If the Russians take Mariupol and move west to link up its armies from Russia through to Transnistria, then Ukraine will have been cleaved in two. Not only would Ukraine have lost a large portion of its territory, it would be completely land-locked. This would leave the future economic prospects of Ukraine in tatters. And as Motyl has shown, any such action undertaken by Russia could change “the balance of power in eastern Europe” (Motyl 2010, 136).
     If Russia begins an all-out assault for the south and east of Ukraine from Donetsk to Odessa the Ukrainian army is ill-equipped to defend itself from a much more powerful adversary. The Russian military has modern military hardware that the Ukrainian military is sorely lacking. Tellingly, the current cease fire came about not as a result of sanctions that have pushed the Russian economy into recession, rather Putin seems to have been brought to the bargaining table by President Barack Obama’s threat to arm the Ukrainian military with American-made weaponry. It appears that violence is the only language that Putin understands.
European Security and the Threat of Russian Ethno-Fascism
     This is not the first time that Europe has come under threat from a fascist nation committed to an ideology of ethnic supremacy. Europe would be wise to heed the lessons of the last utterly devastating conflict to inflict unspeakable horrors upon millions of innocents across its lands. In 1938, when British Foreign Secretary Neville Chamberlain returned to England after having spoken with Adolf Hitler in Munich, he declared that with his agreement with Hitler he had achieved peace in their time. Chamberlain’s drastic misreading of the intentions of the German fascists would have devastating consequences for Europe.
    At the very least, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks the beginning of a new “Cold War” between Russia and the West. Noted Colombia University political scientist Robert Levgold, writing in Foreign affairs asserts that this “new Cold War will affect nearly every important dimension of the international system”, and that Putin’s “emphasis on Russia’s alienation from contemporary Western cultural values will add to the estrangement” (Levgold 2014, 75).  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many leaders in Europe hoped that Russia would become integrated into the larger European community. But Putin’s Russia is moving further and further away from the ideals of European democracy and human rights, and instead Russia has embarked down a path of fascist authoritarianism, in which any and all opposition has been systematically eliminated through violent coercion, imprisonment, and even assassination.
     It is well-known that Vladimir Putin believes that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a tragedy of monumental proportions. Putin’s first job in the KGB had him working in East Germany. When Putin came of age Russia’s borders extended all the way from the Pacific Ocean to Berlin. He would like nothing more than to see the glory of the Soviet Union reconstituted in his preferred image. The xenophobic, reactionary, militaristic ideology espoused by Putin that now dictates Russia’s domestic and foreign policy is a danger not only to Ukraine, but also to Europe and potentially the entire world. The West must stand up to this aggression, or be doomed to repeat the past.
    
Bibliography:
Donbass serdtse Rossii.  [The Don Basin - the heart of Russia.] (1921)   Image ID: 1216161. New York Public Library Slavic Collection.
Johnson, Dominic D.P. and Toft, Monica Duffy. Bringing “Geo” Back into Politics: Evolution, Territoriality and the Contest over Ukraine. Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution.5 (1). (2014):87-91.
Kappeler, Andreas. Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the Imperial Past and Competing Memories. Journal of Eurasian Studies 5. (2014):107-115.
Karatnycky, Adrian and Motyl, Alexander J. The Key to Kiev: Ukraine’s Security Means Europe’s Stability. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 3 (May/June 2009):106-120.  
Levgold, Robert. Managing the New Cold War: What Moscow and Washington Can Learn From the Last One. Foreign Affairs. July/August (2014):74-84.
Motyl, Alexander J. Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovych's Rise, Democracy's Fall. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4 (July/August 2010):125-136.
Tsygankov, Andrei. The Sources of Russia’s Ukraine Policy. Russian Analytical Digest. Issue No. 158. December (2014): 2-11.