The Invasion
In August of 2014, following political upheaval and the resulting
violence, the Russian Federation invaded the neighboring nation of Ukraine. Many
international political commentators were caught unaware. Much like the global
financial crisis of 2008, almost no one saw the arrival of this conflict
coming. Also, like the 2008 financial crisis known as the “Great Recession”,
the seeds of this conflict were sewn well in advance, and seem impossible not
to notice in retrospect. Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander Motyl were some of the
few political commentators to acknowledge the possibility of war. Karatnycky and Motyl, writing for Foreign Affairs in 2009, wrote that
“given Russia’s regime type and its power today, a nondemocratic Russia might
well take advantage of Ukraine’s increased weakness” (Karatnycky and Motyl
2009, 113).
Ethno-cultural associations with space have long been the cause of
conflict. Take Jerusalem for example, where three of the so-called “great”
religions vie for dominance of the land, with rivaling narratives and competing
historiographies that each in turn use as their claim for possession. This
tribalistic ethno-nationalism, itching for war against the “other”, the enemy,
the foreigner, is a cornerstone of modern fascist political thought. When Adolf
Hitler annexed the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, he claimed to be
protecting ethnic Germans. A similar situation has been at play in the foreign
policy of the Russian Federation as of late. A reactionary and xenophobic
regime has now taken root in Moscow, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.
Putin has made it his raison d'être to “protect” ethnic Russians within the
entirety of the former Soviet Union.
With this in mind, the Russian Federation has been increasingly active, both
in terms of its military/espionage activities, and in asserting its
economic/political objectives, within the whole of the former Soviet Union. From
anti-terror operations in the Caucasus and the military offensives in South
Ossetia—a disputed region on Russia’s border with
Georgia—to the “frozen conflict” in Moldova, the Putin
regime has become increasingly aggressive within its perceived sphere of
influence. Many international relations and military experts now see these
actions as “dry runs” for its current actions in Ukraine.
The “Heart”
of Russia
|
Figure 1.
“Donbass serdtse Rossii”
Donbass Heart of Russia
|
The Donets Basin, or
Donbass, is a large region encompassing the eastern most oblasts — regions or states — of Ukraine and extending into Russia until
Rostov on Don. This geological formation is mainly contained within the
internationally recognized borders of Ukraine. The region is the industrial
heartland of not only Ukraine, but has long been featured in Soviet and then
Russian propaganda as the “heart of Russia” (Figure 1).
The
Russification of eastern Ukraine began during the reign of Soviet dictator
Josef Stalin, whose extractionary policy of forced starvation toward Ukraine
led to the mass deaths of ethnic Ukrainians, in an event remembered as the
“Holodomor” —extermination by hunger— which has been deemed by many historians to be an act of genocide.
While Stalin was starving millions of ethnic Ukrainians, he was simultaneously
moving large populations of ethnic Russians into the then-recently depopulated
Donbass of Ukraine. This massive depopulation of ethnic Ukrainians and
deliberate importation of ethnic Russian nationals would have wide and
far-reaching consequences. As Andreas Kappeler notes, as a result of Stalin’s
policies favoring ethnic Russians in Ukraine“[t]he relations between the two
independent states were from the very beginning difficult” and almost all of the
resulting differences between the two nations “have their roots in the imperial
past” (Kappeler 2014, 108).
The
media in the Donbass is exclusively Russian, and Russian media is almost
exclusively under the purview of the Russian state. Under the watchful eye of Vladimir Putin, the
Russian government has consistently cracked down on sources of information that
are not favorable to the state. As Adrian Karatnycky and Alexander Motyl
stated, the Russian media are “now pliant government instruments” (Karatnycky
and Motyl 2009, 114).These Russian state media operations have painted the
Ukrainian people as fascist puppets of the “West”. This constant bombardment of
Russian government propaganda has inevitably led to negative perceptions of the
Ukrainian people by the Russian public, as well as with ethnic Russians in the
east and south of Ukraine. As Karatnycky and Motyl have pointed out, in “polls
conducted in January 2009, some 62 percent of Russians are negatively inclined
toward Ukraine and 24 percent are positively inclined. (In contrast, the same
polls showed that only 9 percent of Ukrainians have negative feelings toward
Russia, whereas 71 percent have positive ones.)” (Karatnycky and Motyl 2009, 114).
A Question
of Identity
The nation of Ukraine has been in a precarious state since its
inception. The lack of a founding national narrative left people unsure about
their national identity and place in world history. As the Soviet Union rapidly dissolved in the
early 1990s, Ukraine became an independent country almost overnight. The main
concern of the Russian government at the time was the fact that Ukraine, as an
integral part of the Soviet Union and its defenses, was home to one of the
largest nuclear arsenals in the world. In an international agreement dubbed the
Budapest Memorandum, The United States, Russia, and Great Britain all committed
to the defense, and recognition of, Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange
for its promise to surrender the entirety of its nuclear forces. This is a
decision that has come to haunt Ukraine.
Since gaining independence, Ukraine has experienced a seesaw of
governments, a “color” revolution, political assassinations, and a deepening
divide between the Russian East and the Ukrainian West. It is exactly these
kinds of divisions along ethnic lines, which lead to the bifurcation of states.
People form their associations with a given piece of land through “duration and
distribution of ethnic kin” within said territory (Johnson and Toft 2014, 91).
And within Ukraine, multiple generations of ethnic Russians have lived in the
eastern regions, particularly in the Donbass. As a result of this, Russia, “under
the pretext of the protection of the rights of linguistic minorities…uses the
language question as an instrument of pressure and intervention into the
internal affairs of Ukraine” (Kappeler 2014, 111).
The
latest revolution in Ukraine occurred when then-President Yanukovich spurned a
promised economic association with the European Union in favor of entry into
Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union, which includes, along with Russia, the
countries of Belarus and Kazakhstan. People
by the hundreds of thousands took the country’s independence square, known as
the “Maidan”, in protest. This last minute switch in favor of the Russian trade
union was seen by many Ukrainian citizens as yet another attempt by Russia to
subvert the will of the Ukrainian people.
Little
Green Men and Hybrid War
When armed Russian-speaking Special Forces arrived in Crimea to take
control of strategic locations throughout the territory, they bore no military
insignia to identify themselves. At the same time, the Russian government denied
having any involvement. These soldiers that had seemingly appeared from
nowhere, were jokingly dubbed “little green men”, in reference to the U.F.O.
phenomenon, and the fact that these soldiers wore green combat fatigues. Although the Russian government initially
denied having any involvement in these military operations, Vladimir Putin
would give a victory speech in the region’s capital Sevastopol several months
later.
Alongside the use of Special Forces and conventional military
operations, the Russians are conducting a massive propaganda and media
relations campaign in both Ukraine, and within Russia itself. This includes
providing local “rebel leaders” with constantly updated lists of talking points
for use when confronted by media organizations. Because of this added
propaganda component of the war, the current conflict has been called a “Hybrid
War”.
When these Russian Special Forces operators arrived in Crimea, they
immediately seized the parliament and hoisted the flag of the Russian
Federation. Simultaneously, they captured other strategic locations in the region,
most importantly the local television, cellular, and radio communications
stations. These communication sites would be necessary to disseminate
information favorable to the Russian government to the local populous.
One
of the most prominent features of Russia’s immense state-backed system of media
being put to use in the conduct of this Hybrid War is the television network Russia
Today. RT has a budget that enables it to be broadcast in multiple languages
and territories twenty four hours a day.
This broadcast presents viewers with imagery that paints the Ukrainians
as uncaring fascists that are perpetrating a genocide against ethnic Russians
in the east of Ukraine.
The
Birth of a Nation
Ironically, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has given it the very thing it
was lacking: a foundational national narrative. The Ukrainians now see
themselves as a people and a nation fighting for its survival and the right to
self-governance in the face of foreign aggression. In Ukraine there is a new patriotic
fervor, and new national slogans such as “glory to Ukraine, glory to heroes”. A
large portion of Ukraine’s defense forces are comprised of volunteer units with
names like “Azov Battalion” and “Donbass Battalion”. Unlike the national army,
these people are not paid for their service and aren’t entitled to government
health benefits that are available to professional soldiers, but nevertheless,
they fight. These men and women that fill the ranks of these units are farmers,
business professionals, teachers, and former company owners that feel it is
their patriotic duty to defend their homeland.
The
new Ukraine, oriented toward Europe, is trying to break free from its subaltern
position in relation to Russia. The Ukrainians look at their neighbors that
have become a part of the European Union and are filled with a sense of both
apathy and envy. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s neighbors
that have become members of the European Union—Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, etc…—have seen an explosion of growth in their economies and a
corresponding rise in standards of living. Whereas, Ukraine itself has
stagnated—by some estimates its economy has actually
contracted in real terms since independence—the former Soviet countries aligned with Europe have thrived. Within
the populace of Ukraine, this has caused a desire to bring themselves into
alignment with the greater European community. This desire for European
alignment, has in turn, bred yet more anger and suspicion on the part of Russia
toward Ukraine and its ambitions.
“Novorossiya”
Many of the Russian soldiers fighting in the Donbass proclaim to be
fighting for the formation of a new nation called “Novorossiya” (New Russia).
The Russian soldiers that are fighting for this imagined state fly a battle
flag that, because of its visual similarity, is quite reminiscent of the
Confederate “stars and bars” from the American Civil War. In many instances,
flying alongside this battle flag, is a flag with a depiction of Jesus Christ—in traditional Russian Orthodox fashion—upon a red background, that is an adaptation of a Tsarist imperial
flag from the 1800s. This is an obvious allusion to the alliance of the Russian
Orthodox Church, and the ethno-nationalist ideology espoused by Vladimir Putin.
This imperialist component of Putin’s fascist ideology, which harkens back to
the 1880s, stands in stark contrast with the Ukrainian narrative of
independence and struggle for democracy. As Andreas Kappeler asserts, for the “Russian
Empire the close cooperation of the state and the Orthodox Church was an
important factor of legitimation and stability. Today’s Russia follows this
policy and is using the Orthodox Church as an instrument of its politics of
hegemony” (Kappeler 2014, 111). The term
Novorossiya itself, in reference to the area of the Donbass harkens back to
Tsarist terminology, and has been quite deliberately reintroduced by Putin.
The
use of such terminology by Putin and his regime is telling. Combined with
statements like “Ukraine is not even a country”, and that the Ukrainian
military’s defense of its territory as “smell[ing] of genocide”, given at
multiple press conferences, we are given valuable insight into Vladimir Putin’s
inner thoughts. Andrei Tsygankov, writing for Russian Analytical Digest, states that the “Kremlin now view[s]…Ukrainian
values as incompatible with those of Russia” and that Putin said in a press
conference the he viewed the recent political actions in “Ukraine as the
‘rampage of Nazi, nationalist, and anti-Semitic forces.’”(Tsygankov 2014, 4). Note the attribution of negative terms like
‘Nazi’ and ‘anti-Semitic” to the democratic actions of the Ukrainian people.
This labeling of the enemy with your own flaws is yet another example straight
from the neo-fascist playbook. Russia has clearly shown that it is more than
willing to use military force to achieve its political objectives. And if
Putin’s objective is to reunite the entirety of the ethnic Russian population
with its previous homeland, then the danger to Ukraine and Europe as a whole
could not be clearer.
Torn
Asunder
Currently the intensity of the war has slowly deescalated as the
Ukrainian and Russian governments have agreed to a ceasefire known as the
“Minsk Agreement”, named for the city in which the French and German-brokered deal
occurred. Many, including the Ukrainian government, do not believe that the
cease fire will hold, and that it is merely a ploy by Putin to bide time and
amass further forces for an all-out assault on the strategic port city of
Mariupol. Mariupol is strategic not only because it is a port city, but also
because of the fact that it is the only large city in the region that separates
Russian forces in the Donbass from those in Crimea.
As
mentioned earlier, Russia has previously intervened militarily in the areas of
the former Soviet territories. One of these territories is that of Moldova and
its Transnistria separatist region that borders western Ukraine and the port
city of Odessa. Here, Russia maintains a troop presence of several thousand
men. The fear in Kyiv is that the Russians will not be content with their gains
in Crimea and the Donbass, and that they could launch a war for the totality of
the regions of Ukraine containing ethnic Russians. If the Russians take
Mariupol and move west to link up its armies from Russia through to
Transnistria, then Ukraine will have been cleaved in two. Not only would
Ukraine have lost a large portion of its territory, it would be completely
land-locked. This would leave the future economic prospects of Ukraine in
tatters. And as Motyl has shown, any such action undertaken by Russia could
change “the balance of power in eastern Europe” (Motyl 2010, 136).
If Russia
begins an all-out assault for the south and east of Ukraine from Donetsk to
Odessa the Ukrainian army is ill-equipped to defend itself from a much more
powerful adversary. The Russian military has modern military hardware that the
Ukrainian military is sorely lacking. Tellingly, the current cease fire came
about not as a result of sanctions that have pushed the Russian economy into
recession, rather Putin seems to have been brought to the bargaining table by
President Barack Obama’s threat to arm the Ukrainian military with
American-made weaponry. It appears that violence is the only language that
Putin understands.
European
Security and the Threat of Russian Ethno-Fascism
This is not the first time that Europe has come under threat from a
fascist nation committed to an ideology of ethnic supremacy. Europe would be
wise to heed the lessons of the last utterly devastating conflict to inflict
unspeakable horrors upon millions of innocents across its lands. In 1938, when
British Foreign Secretary Neville Chamberlain returned to England after having
spoken with Adolf Hitler in Munich, he declared that with his agreement with
Hitler he had achieved peace in their time. Chamberlain’s drastic misreading of
the intentions of the German fascists would have devastating consequences for
Europe.
At
the very least, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine marks the beginning of a new “Cold
War” between Russia and the West. Noted Colombia University political scientist
Robert Levgold, writing in Foreign
affairs asserts that this “new Cold War will affect nearly every important
dimension of the international system”, and that Putin’s “emphasis on Russia’s
alienation from contemporary Western cultural values will add to the
estrangement” (Levgold 2014, 75). After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, many leaders in Europe hoped that Russia
would become integrated into the larger European community. But Putin’s Russia
is moving further and further away from the ideals of European democracy and
human rights, and instead Russia has embarked down a path of fascist
authoritarianism, in which any and all opposition has been systematically
eliminated through violent coercion, imprisonment, and even assassination.
It
is well-known that Vladimir Putin believes that the dissolution of the Soviet
Union was a tragedy of monumental proportions. Putin’s first job in the KGB had
him working in East Germany. When Putin came of age Russia’s borders extended
all the way from the Pacific Ocean to Berlin. He would like nothing more than
to see the glory of the Soviet Union reconstituted in his preferred image. The
xenophobic, reactionary, militaristic ideology espoused by Putin that now
dictates Russia’s domestic and foreign policy is a danger not only to Ukraine,
but also to Europe and potentially the entire world. The West must stand up to
this aggression, or be doomed to repeat the past.
Bibliography:
Donbass
serdtse Rossii.
[The Don Basin - the heart of Russia.] (1921) Image ID: 1216161. New York Public Library
Slavic Collection.
Johnson, Dominic D.P. and Toft, Monica Duffy. Bringing “Geo” Back into Politics:
Evolution, Territoriality and the Contest over Ukraine. Cliodynamics: The
Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution.5 (1). (2014):87-91.
Kappeler, Andreas. Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the
Imperial Past and Competing Memories. Journal of Eurasian Studies 5.
(2014):107-115.
Karatnycky, Adrian and
Motyl, Alexander J. The Key to Kiev: Ukraine’s
Security Means Europe’s Stability. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 3
(May/June 2009):106-120.
Levgold, Robert. Managing the New Cold War: What Moscow and
Washington Can Learn From the Last One. Foreign Affairs. July/August
(2014):74-84.
Motyl, Alexander J. Ukrainian Blues: Yanukovych's Rise,
Democracy's Fall. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4 (July/August
2010):125-136.
Tsygankov, Andrei. The Sources of Russia’s Ukraine Policy.
Russian Analytical Digest. Issue No. 158. December (2014): 2-11.
No comments:
Post a Comment